

MILITARY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

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Abstract:

The paper aims at a study of the recent trend of increased militarization of border security in the face of mass migratory influx. The theoretical framework of analysis draws on the findings of the theory of civil-military relations, particularly with regard to the concept of 'core military missions'. The basic premise is that the failure of the liberal interventionism and export of democracy (often by military means or by stirring internal opposition movements towards regime change) has led to catastrophic consequences, which in return hit as a boomerang not only the world interventionist powers but also many other (transitory) states. Among other concerns, the dilemma of militarization of border control has become an issue of special significance both for the international and national security. The renewed military mission of safeguarding the borders from the migrant flows calls for urgent theoretical deliberations and practical solutions.

Key words: refugees, international migration, core military missions, border control, militarization.

Introduction

After years of neglecting the ongoing humanitarian catastrophes and a mass of people fleeing from devastated states in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, a mass exodus of immigrants has occurred. They were mainly traveling across the Mediterranean, and later the Aegean Sea. It was only when these refugees and migrant flows struck the Balkan and other European states that the alarm was turned on: by the end of 2015, migration into Europe was widely understood to be both a European Union and global problem (Tinker 2016, 395). The assessment of the situation on the ground as well as the overview of the plans developed by the European states

confirm that the crisis of such a scope was neither expected nor properly managed (Garb 2018, 2). The EU member states as well as the EU as such failed in so many ways in crisis management but mostly in terms of the efforts coordination, solidarity and responsibility. In each state, and particularly in those that were on the transit route or a final destination a number of governmental and non-governmental actors were activated.

When it comes to the military involvement, it is worth noting that the European Agenda on Migration of the European Commission (European Commission 2015) mentions the military only once (in the context of the surveillance issue) and possible common security, while defence policy operations/missions are mentioned three times. Obviously, dealing with the refugees and migrants in European states and under European laws has been seen mostly as police and not military/defence matter. However, as the crisis has been escalating and the institutional incapacity has been displayed, almost all affected countries have started deploying their armed forces on the borders. Also, in February 2016 NATO sent warships to the Aegean Sea. Their mission was left deliberately murky: NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the media that “this is not about stopping or pushing back refugee boats.” NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, Gen. Philip Breedlove said that deploying the ships was a political decision and defining their mission remains part of the ‘military work’ yet to be done. (Albert 2016). Furthermore, a specific type of international military cooperation and assistance has become a permanent characteristic of border management. The European (as well as the Balkan) militaries have faced a relatively new challenge: they have been enforced to take over a new (*sic!*) military mission of responding to international migration and refugee crisis.

This paper gives an overview of the development of the ‘core military missions’ from the perspective of the theory of civil-military relations, with a particular aim to determine if the military is the right institution to deal with the migrant/refugee crises. The question could be rephrased also in the following way: how does dealing with the migrant/refugee crisis affect the military as an institution? The starting premise is that the issue of ‘core military missions’, or rephrased - the question *what are armed forces for* - is still relevant, dynamic and perplexing. In this occasion we put the main focus on a number of questions related to the current challenges for the armed forces. Is coping with migrant/refugee crisis is a new or maybe just a renewed military mission, which had always been there? In the light of ongoing global/regional tendencies, is the military supposed to be better trained and prepared? How does this military mission reconcile with humanitarianism? There are just a few of a vast repertoire of relevant issues that call for elaborated answers both on a theoretical and empirical level.

The paper is structured in three sections: first, we offer an overview of theoretical debate over the core military missions. In the second section, the focus is on the historical experiences of the military forces engaged in dealing with mass migration and refugee influxes. The third section examines how states characterize rising migration rates as a national security threat. The final part of this paper offers some conclusions on the basic question about the effects of the militarization of European borders.

Core Military Missions in Perspective

Having analysed the European armed forces, Edmunds (2006, 1059) has argued that they are undergoing a profound series of shifts in their core roles, which are increasingly challenging long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured and organized. He emphasizes four main trends: a decline in the significance of the defence of national territory as a core organizing principle for regular armed forces; the increasing dominance of a model of military professionalization that equates 'modern' armed forces with smaller, highly skilled, flexible force structures able to project power abroad, whether for war-fighting or peacekeeping operations; the emergence of a number of 'new' security challenges, such as terrorism, drug smuggling and illegal migration, which refocuses military roles on internal security issues, and the continuing salience of a wider domestic social and political role for armed forces.

The theoretical debate over 'core military missions' is but an examination of the military's functional imperative (Huntington 1957). Bearing in mind that the theory of civil-military relations was developed at the beginning of the Cold War, one should keep in mind that these deliberations were very much related to the realist school of thought. Not surprisingly, the main functional imperative for any military was the defence of a country from external threats, or in other words - guaranteeing its survival in an anarchical world. Edmunds (1988, 29) put it quite clearly, claiming that "the principal, and frequently the sole, state agency responsible for the security of all citizens and national territory against external physical threats; other responsibilities, either external or internal, are purely contingent." Having been aware that this premise could not apply on all armies and states, especially on the ones in the so-called second and/or the Third world, most scholars of civil-military relations recognized that a purely externally orientated definition of the functional imperative is too narrow, because in many countries armed forces had often been employed primarily in internal security roles (protection from internal enemies). Furthermore, due to the bipolar world order, and especially the danger of a global nuclear clash, the core military mission transformed from military victory toward deterrent and war avoidance. Garnett (1991, 79) described this change in the following way: "One of the changes that has occurred since the Second World War is the increasing sophistication with which military power is exploited without military force being used. This is the age of brinkmanship, crisis management, and deterrence. These phenomena support the thesis that modern military force tends to be threatened and manipulated in peacetime rather than used in war".

The aftermath of the Cold War was expected to bring a dramatic, or better a positive change in the international arena. The (alleged) 'end of history' was about to bring new role of military under democracy, along with a unification of core military missions in all nations that embraced liberal political order and market economy. The dominant (neo)liberal school of thought *inter alia* affected the theoretical assumptions in the field of civil-military relations. It was believed that the perception of military as the principal state agency responsible for the security of the citizens and national territory against external physical threats had become outdated; what had been considered to be 'purely contingent' responsibilities *de facto* took the lead. The post-Cold

War (new?) security agenda spelled out a number of non-military functions such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, disaster management and humanitarian intervention. It was believed that the post-modern (predominantly intra-state and ethnic) conflicts and other non-military risks had replaced the classical 'enemy'. All these involved many tasks for which the conventional military was ill-prepared (Vankovska 1999). The optimists argued - or better, hoped - that the major challenge for military will be shifting away from training for war toward prevention of war, i.e. conflict prevention. The leading theoreticians of civil-military relations were arguing that the military was facing another transition period with regard to its *raison d'être* and organization. Moskos and Burk (1994) believed that modern mass army, characteristic for the age of nationalism, had gradually begun its transition toward post-modern armed force. The new military was supposed to adapt to the post-Wesphalian international system, in which classical state sovereignty principle stepped backward before the international organizations and institutions. Numerous scholars argued that war has fundamentally changed its characteristics, and that Clausewitzian trinity (state - military - people) had become obsolete. Post-modern society was expected to find appropriate responses to post-modern wars and challenges (Mueller, 1996), as conventional military was ill-prepared for the 'new wars' and 'wars of third kind', to use Kaldor's terms (2013). The military, prepared to face classic large-scale armed conflict, had an ambivalent attitude towards new reality, which was best described by Van Creveld (1991, 3): "a ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defence departments all over the 'developed' world - the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance". On the new security agenda, it seemed that the military aspects of security had lost primacy, at the expense of three other dimensions of security - i.e. economic, political, societal and environmental. It was exactly when the top brass in the developed countries got worried over its relevance, the controversial concept of so-called military humanitarianism came in rescue. Especially, NATO took advantage of the situation in former Yugoslavia (first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, including the involvement in the consequent refugee crisis) in order to strengthen its legitimacy and to justify budgetary demands.

The dramatic events of 9/11 also helped military finds so necessary enemy. Global 'war on terror' asked for development of expeditionary capabilities at the expense of other military missions. This is visible particularly in the NATO accession region, where states have invested significant efforts in developing forces that can be deployed wherever necessary. The Macedonian case is quite illustrative in this regard, with an extremely high ratio of deployed military forces in Afghanistan (and Iraq for some years) and the willingness to deploy more troops upon Western allies' demand. The era of liberal interventionism has additionally given *raison d'être* to the militaries in the developed world but also in their partner countries. The long list of military myths (Eide and Thee, 1980) has been enriched by additional engagement in spreading democracy, responsibility to protect, regime change, etc. The long list of military interventions (many of which had no UN authorization) has had a boomerang effect, so the 'democratized' and 'liberated' countries, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc. have become devastated areas that produce terrorism and mass migration.

In much of the civil–military relations literature it is argued that the changes of the armed forces’ functional imperative do not occur in response to an objective, functional reassessment of the nature of threat, but rather as a consequence of domestic and international socio-political influences that shape states’ perceptions of what their armed forces should look like and the purposes they should serve (Edmunds 2006). Actually, there are two dominant positions over the factors that primarily determine military missions, originating from Huntington’s theoretical framework. Although it is a matter of mutual and dialectic influence, the everlasting question reads: what comes first, functional or societal imperative? Edmunds seems to argue that the socio-political factors (political culture, public opinion, public expectations and system of values) have taken the lead ahead of risk and threat assessment and adequate responses by the military. In era of globalization, or at least, the narrative of a global world, one should take into account the developments and narratives about humanitarianism, solidarity, empathy, etc., which affect all components of the societal imperative. Having in mind that the power to shape public opinion and even ‘reality’ lies in the power centres, the military simply follows the suit, or better do what politicians have decided. The variety, ambiguity and changeability of security threats makes it difficult for military leadership to determine rationally and objectively the functional imperative. On the other hand, the political class supported by the corporate media, business lobby and academia is able far more easily to point out what should current priorities and main missions of the military be. At the end of the day, the principle of civilian supremacy makes it look normal and acceptable. For example, it is now well known that Iraq and Libya interventions were launched on false pretences but the political leaderships of intervening countries managed to convince the public that it was necessary to respond militarily in order to safeguard national security or to save civilians’ lives.

However, the failure of interventionism is the best illustrated by today’s migrant and refugee crisis. Not so long ago, some Western militaries that were willing to invest in expeditionary capabilities in fighting terrorism or international conflict management, but now they face a peculiar situation to use their capacities more frequently for internal security provision, such as policing and safeguarding sport and other events, guarding airports, border control - and managing migrant/refugee crisis. If at the beginning of the demise of the Cold War architecture it looked that the military was a victim of its own success (so many non-traditional missions were transferred to it), from today’s perspective it seems that they have fallen a victim of their failures in external (expeditionary) missions, mostly because of the wrong political decisions made elsewhere.

International Migration as a Post-Cold War Security Concern

International migrations are nothing new in the human history. What has been changing is the very treatment of the phenomenon, which varies between a security and humanitarian concern and measures, or a mix of both. Millions of individuals, spurred by poverty are crossing borders to search for employment or simply a better life. Millions of others are forced involuntarily

from their homes/countries by war, conflict, famine, environmental degradation, etc. According to IOM's data, today more than 244 million people around the world can be classified as international migrants (3.3% of world population). Global displacement is at a record high, with the number of internally displaced at over 40 million and the number of refugees more than 22 million (IOM 2018). Governments around the world have responded to the crisis in diverse and often contradictory ways. Few of them have welcomed legal immigrants and refugees, while the majority have demonstrated unwillingness to accept an influx of illegal or undocumented immigrants who have arrived either individually or in small groups, or as a part of mass movements. The influx has evoked xenophobia and dramatic legal and other responses. Many countries have enacted restrictive laws and regulations designed both to deter illegal entrants and to reassert border control. Some have reinforced civilian border patrol agencies with extra personnel and advanced detection equipment, while a number of governments have started building fences or formidable walls along their borders (Smith 1999).

Historically speaking, the military was used to protect the state borders not only from armed invasions but also from unarmed illegal migrants by ground, air and naval forces. In some cases (such as the countries in Eastern Europe or USSR) the military was used to deter not only illegal immigration but also emigration. The end of the Cold War caused a wave of migrations westwards. For instance, Austria stationed military troops (as assistance to regular border guards in their patrols) along the Austro-Hungarian border to prevent illegal emigration from Hungary and other Eastern European countries in the early 1990s. In 1994 Greece transferred troops to the border to stop illegal emigration from Albania, with an explanation that the move was not meant to threaten its neighbour. More recently, Greece again deployed army patrols, now along its border with Turkey. In 1995, when Italy faced an influx of illegal immigrants from Albania, it also deployed an army contingent. Four years later, the Italian government stated that it would consider a "full-scale military intervention" to stop migrant trafficking if the Albanian government requested it. Consequently, some countries, notably Australia, deploy naval force units to track or intercept international migrants. In some rare cases, countries have deployed aviation units to detect illegal immigrants. In early 1997, Japan's Air Self-Defence Force dispatched several units to search for illegal Chinese immigrants who were allegedly *en route* to Japan aboard human smuggling ships.

Reliance on military when it comes to migrant flows is nothing new, in spite of the recent debate on militarization of borders that claims the opposite. Fences and guns have been used since long ago in many parts of the world (USA being just one notorious example), but the dominant narrative in 'united Europe' has differed a lot until recently. In the post-Cold War era, the Western state-building efforts - particularly in the context of security sector reform - focused on an introduction of a new model of integrated border management. The basic idea of this model rests on the premise military should not deal with border protection (as it usually did in the *ancient regime*), and instead civilian border police and/or similar agencies should be responsible for managing border security, including migration or refugee movements. This concept was particularly promoted as a significant element of security sector reform in the post-socialist and post-conflict countries that were trying to join European and Euro-Atlantic integrations.

It seems as if things have changed since 2015/2016 when an increasing number of EU and non-EU (Balkan) states have begun relying on military force to accomplish border security and manage mass migrant flows. In some cases military troops are deployed on the borders to patrol for illegal immigrants, while in others military forces are engaged to help manage or house large numbers of migrants and refugees. Also many EU countries are increasingly inclined to deploy police or military forces for international migration missions far away from the homeland. It raises the question of militarization of border protection high on the public and expert agenda. The scale of international migration has grown, so many countries have begun to characterize the phenomenon of migration as a serious security concern. The question then arises: Why is international migration seen as a security threat and, moreover, is this perception justified? Weiner (1995) has suggested at least five scenarios that may prompt governments to characterize international migration as a security concern. First, host governments may view immigrants as an internal political risk. It is the case when a government and/or the society believes immigrants and refugees threaten the host country's cultural identity. Local residents may fear that large numbers of immigrants might overwhelm them demographically and undermine their political and cultural dominance as well as threaten their national identity. In Western Europe, fears about the cultural and political impact of immigration have helped fuel the rise of rightist, xenophobic political parties. Second, governments may perceive migrants or refugees as a social or economic burden because of their alleged criminality or welfare dependency. Third factor that causes international migration to be viewed as a security concern has been the role of media coverage (the so-called "CNN effect"). Characterizing illegal immigration or mass migration as a national security concern also helps pave the way for military involvement in immigration matters in the future.

The first challenges to the EU appeared in early 90-ies. Later on, the wave of 'fake asylum seekers' (mostly from the Balkans) got far more attention (although military responses were not anticipated). The 2015/2016 refugee crisis has been a real turning point, since the Fortress Europe proved to be both unwilling to live up to its liberal appearance and unable to cope with such a mass movement. According to Nessel (2009) even prior to this peak, the EU, like USA, has cast a wide net in its multifaceted approach to deterring migrants and refugees alike from reaching its land borders. It no longer waits for refugees to seek protection at their borders. Rather, the EU proactively sends its forces directly into refugee-sending nations (whether by stationing officers at airports or ships in the sending-nation's waters) in order to prevent their citizens from fleeing to its mainland.

Coming through the Balkans almost 764 000 migrants reached the EU member-states, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia in 2015 (Frontex 2016, 16). As soon as the governments of these countries realized that their police forces and civilian capabilities were not sufficient to handle the situation, they deployed their armed forces. According to Nemeth (2018a), almost 7 000 troops with significant amount of equipment and numerous vehicles were sent by Austria (1 600 troops), Bulgaria (140 troops), Hungary (4 500 troops) and Slovenia (700 troops) to their respective borders in order to help to manage the migration crisis in 2015-2016. Ever since their troops have been participating in patrolling the affected borders, supporting civilian authorities

and building border fences (500 km by Hungary; 200 km by Slovenia; 150 km by Bulgaria, 4 km by Austria). Thus border control has become one of the core tasks of the armed forces. Other states, such as Czech Republic and Slovakia, although not affected directly by the migrant crisis, they conducted exercises, where hundreds of military and civilian personnel prepared together for a possible migration wave, and also offered military and civilian capacities for the neighbouring countries to tackle the migration crisis. Individual EU member states also negotiate agreements with refugee-producing nations, so that any refugees actually landing on EU soil can quickly be sent south again. In addition, they provide funding for southern border states to build detention centres.

Obviously, these developments have changed the dynamics of regional defence cooperation. For instance, Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) has become the most relevant Central European platform for defence collaboration against irregular migration. Since 2016 the defence ministers of the CEDC countries have been regularly discussing ways to enhance military cooperation with regard to irregular migration, and they also invite their counterparts from Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro to these meetings. The first ever CEDC military exercise was conducted in September 2017, where altogether 2360 CEDC troops made preparations for a possible new migration crisis. Many European armed forces are undergoing a profound series of shifts in their core roles again, and have been increasingly rediscovering their traditional territorial defence, internal security and nation building roles. Nemeth (2018b) names that militarisation of border management without giving it any negative connotation.

Militarization of Migration

The term military humanitarianism has been coined especially in the height of the 1999 NATO campaign. It is now a widely-used oxymoron for an engagement in coercive international interventions under humanitarian pretext. For instance, NATO air forces were bombing military and civilian targets in FR Yugoslavia, but also assisting refugees in the camps in Albania and Macedonia.

In the context of the current refugee crisis a similar rhetoric has been used but in a rather altered manner. One way governments try to skirt the political controversy of immigration operations is to label them as humanitarian operations. The humanitarian label often conveys some degree of benevolence or altruism on the part of the acting nation and, in some cases, can help that government muster political support - both domestically and internationally - for its actions. But the label 'humanitarian' should not obscure the fact that humanitarian motives are sometimes co-mingled with anti-immigration or immigration enforcement objectives in these types of operations. The problematic relationship between humanitarianism and politics was described by James Orbinski of *Médecins Sans Frontières*, on the occasion of his Nobel Lecture: "Humanitarianism is not a tool to end war or to create peace. It is a citizen's response to political failure. It is an immediate, short term act that cannot erase the long term necessity of political responsibility." (Orbinski 1999). While Orbinski was criticising those interventions called 'military-

humanitarian', nowadays are intentionally framing the migration management with use of military means as a humanitarian emergency. For instance, in March 2016, in his address to the European parliament, Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not mention to what extent, in recent years, the militarisation of migration and border controls has been explicitly bound with notions of humanitarianism. Logics of 'securitization and humanitarianism' that highlight a 'symbiotic relationship' between 'care and control', that is, between 'the humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military (the hand that strikes)' (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 59).

The moral discourses typically associated with the humanitarian aid organisations are today gaining importance in the context of border control, which makes clear what types of political and epistemological implications this discursive dislocation has. Also the legitimacy of the military-humanitarian operation depends on how it is described and explained through media. Public discourse on migration has been characterized by an increasing politicization, i.e. a steady rise in importance of the migration question, until it becomes a central part of the political agenda (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2009). It did not take long to securitize the problem of migration both in the public and political domain, as Colombo (2017) rightly claims. She suggests that understanding the discourses on the recent 2014–2015 refugee crisis, one should take into account Bigo's concept of an "internal security field" and Walters' concept of "domopolitics". According to Bigo, a "security continuum" stretches from terrorism to regulation of asylum rights, including immigration, and migratory flows. Within this continuum, which is organized on a transnational basis, questions of asylum and migration become "security" much more than human rights or citizenship questions (Bigo 2000). This process can be regarded as strictly connected to the concept of domopolitics, which refers "to the government of the state (but, crucially, other political spaces as well) as a home" (Walters 2004, 241). Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land, and security. It rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home ... it has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place ... the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not" (ibid.).

Almost simultaneously, border control is redefined within a moral imagination that puts emphasis on human vulnerability. The soldiers' activities are depicted as similar to the recurring type of imagery of aid delivery, with just rescued, grateful migrants receiving food and water. Within the media and other propaganda materials it is usually done outside of any historical or political framework, as shows Musaro's analysis (2016) of *Mare Nostrum* operation. In his view, the issue of migration flows is here construed as a journey without destination, as a tragic game of fate. As protagonists of a crisis that comes from nowhere, migrants are depicted at the same time as subjects who are forced to put themselves in danger – departing on unsafe boats – and as subjects at risk (of death and trafficking) who need to be saved. To sum up, speaking the language of combatting human smuggling and potential terrorists, while rescuing lives and protecting migrants' human rights, *Mare Nostrum* performs the spectacle of the 'humanitarian battlefield'. On 15 October 2015, during his visit to the Italian Parliament, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon,

paid homage 'to the Italian soldiers who saved thousands of human lives in the Mediterranean', and thanked 'the Italian population for the efforts made to welcome and assist migrants.' The Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, referred to Italy as a country of the Italian officers who became nurses to deliver babies in the ships. It is an Italy we are proud - he concluded. As Musaro puts it rightly, "the bio-political imperative of managing lives is expressed through an aesthetics of trauma, where war (on migrants) is represented both as an intimate experience of sorrow and a public act of peace-making" (ibid). However, it did not take long for the military to clash migrants on the streets of some Italian cities.

Traditional military planners are less than enthusiastic at the prospect of military troops being used in the quasi-police or civilian humanitarian roles that immigration operations entail. Moreover, for many military leaders, the use of military assets to counter illegal immigration or large-scale refugee flows is inconsistent with the military's traditional fighting role. Lange (1998, 106) has observed that the sentiment held among most U.S. military officers is that "the purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation's wars. Military officers trained to have that mind-set will inevitably find humanitarian operations to be a secondary activity." After the 1994-1995 Cuban refugee crisis, Pentagon drew up plans to relieve military troops from refugee care by hiring civilians instead. One reason some military professionals oppose the use of the armed forces in immigration control is the potentially negative impact such missions might have on the military's traditional war-fighting ability. Military leaders generally place a great deal of emphasis on preparedness or readiness, and non-war fighting missions are often viewed as distractions that do tittle to promote soldiering skills. Moreover, these missions can be financially burdensome, particularly during times, as in recent years, when military budgets are facing austerity pressures. In particular, refugee care missions involving the establishment and maintenance of "tent cities" can be particularly costly due to the extensive and unique logistical demands that these missions require. Another reason why military leaders resist the idea of using troops in immigration operations is the possibility that such operations could provoke political controversy and potential backlash against the military. In most countries, immigration questions and policies are controversial and often emotional. Military professionals often would prefer to stay out of - or above politics. But once an issue has been securitized, i.e. related to the state/nation's existence, the military becomes the most important institutions. The practice of the recent migrant crisis proves that when security is about risk management, it becomes a matter of long-term security governance (Vezovnik 2017, 14).

According to some scholars (Nessel 2009), there are a number of advantages from relying on the military in border management: first, large-scale refugee movements call for an adequate logistical response in order to prevent possible violence and chaos. Military possesses all organizational and other capabilities that are often unmatched by other government agencies, even those agencies that work with immigrants directly. Second, military units are capable of establishing a controlled and organized response to an emergency within a matter of days or hours. Third, professional military forces have their own medical, legal and social services personnel accustomed to handling chaotic and unpredictable situations. Fourth, they may have linguists to

provide language translation services and who can assist immigration authorities in completing refugee screenings. Fifth, military forces can be effective in interdiction operations, which in some respects parallel combat patrols for which soldiers are often trained. Finally, military forces are often proficient in the use of advanced detection equipment that is frequently used in migration operations.

The case in support of military involvement in migration issues asserts that the presence of military forces in such emergencies has helped prevent or mitigate violence and, in some situations, has saved lives. Additionally, military forces are often better equipped to handle or control riots that may erupt in refugee or migrant camps. When migrants who live in the camps perceive that they have little chance of gaining political asylum in their desired destination country, their mood can become desperate, especially if they remain in these camps for an extended period of time.

Some experts from the ground, especially the members of the aid community, point out a number of disadvantages, based on practical experiences in refugee crises in different parts of the world. For instance, Fiona Terry (2001) from *Médecins Sans Frontières* argues that although many aid/humanitarian organizations have welcomed military engagement in logistical support during refugee crisis, the appropriateness of an increased military presence beside humanitarian organisations in the field remains questionable. In more detail, she claims that the motivation of the military is different from that of humanitarian organisations, even if the intervention is couched in “humanitarian” terms. Namely, humanitarian action is premised on the equal worth of all human beings, while military interventions have been selectively undertaken by governments with direct national interests. Also, outside military forces are rarely perceived as impartial in conflicts, compromising the image, and hence the effectiveness of aid organisations that associate with them. Third, the military lacks the technical competence to respond to the needs of refugee populations. Military forces are trained and equipped to provide medical care and facilities to a predominately male, adult, healthy population. Finally, according to Terry (2001, 1431), the most serious shortcoming of military involvements in relief operations of the past decade does not concern what they do, but what they do not do. Protection from violence is the most vital need of refugee and displaced populations today, and is a task that humanitarian organisations are unable to assume. Yet most military forces have been deployed with a humanitarian mandate aimed at providing or protecting relief supplies. This mandate gives governments an image of doing something.

When a government decides to involve its military in immigration matters, it often sets up the military for criticism from immigration and refugee advocacy groups. For instance, the US society usually faces a dilemma of betraying its values and its ideals (as immigrant-made society) if it resorted to a military response to its long tradition of welcoming immigrants and refugees. Yet this value - like many others - has already been sacrificed for the sake of national interest. When Italy chose to deploy its army along its Adriatic coastline, some immigrant associations and other political groups strongly condemned the move. (Pina, 1995). Another factor contributing to the political sensitivities of using military forces in international migration operations is the risk of unplanned or misdirected violence. In general, military troops, in contrast to police agents or

border guards, are trained for violent combat or combat-support tasks. Few military academies, schools and basic training regimens around the world provide adequate training on how to deal with the unique problems associated with migration and refugee flows. Thus when young, zealous soldiers who have been trained for traditional warfare suddenly confront an influx of would-be immigrants, a major concern is that they may act in accordance with their military training and, perhaps, respond too aggressively.

Conclusion

The increased use of military force to deal with migrants marks a dramatic shift in how many countries view the challenge of international migration, treating it less as a political problem and rather as a security and military concern. There is an ongoing shift of understanding the (migrant) crisis as a concept concerned with protection, stability, security and self-survival. Therefore, the use of all means at the disposal becomes a necessity. It creates a ground for legitimation of the new military mission of many armies in the countries affected by mass migration.

As the scale of international migration grows around the world - driven by such factors as population growth, unemployment in source countries and rising economic disparities between nations - many governments are likely to continue classifying migration as a national security concern and deploying military forces in both interdiction and repatriation operations. The fact that military forces generally can provide a quick and efficient response to situations that can often be logistically challenging partially explains this growing trend. The increased reliance on military force indicates a fundamental change in ways the armed forces will be used in the decades ahead.

From a legal and moral perspective, the apparently inexorable trend of increasing involvement of military forces in international migration events leaves certain troubling questions unanswered: has international migration become so serious as to necessitate a military response? Is military force an appropriate means by which nations can respond to migration and refugee flows?

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